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Addressing the Potential Threat of
Bioterrorism—Value Added to an
Improved Public Health Infrastructure
The use of biological weapons was banned in
1972 by the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Deployment, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons (1). Caches of
biological weapons still exist, however, and their
illegal use in military operations cannot be
discounted entirely (2).
The threat of biological warfare seems
remote to industrialized nations, which have
enjoyed decades of peace and prosperity. In
contrast, the threat of bioterrorism, in which
biological agents are used by extremists as
weapons against civilian populations, generates
considerable anxiety. Although the likelihood of
a bioterrorist attack is difficult to predict, the
consequences of a successful attack could be
devastating and cannot be ignored. Unlike
attacks involving conventional or even chemical
weapons, which could be readily detected and
limited to a specific geographic area, an attack
with a biological agent (and the resulting
symptoms of exposed persons) could remain
undetected for days, would be widely scattered,
and depending on the etiologic agent, might not
be identified immediately as a manmade event.
Secondary cases would confound epidemiologic
investigations as well.
Regardless of the source, surveillance of
infectious diseases, detection and investigation
of outbreaks, identification of etiologic agents
and their modes of transmission, and the
development of prevention and control strategies
are responsibilities of public health agencies.
Acquiring and sustaining the capability for an
adequate response to bioterrorism requires
thoughtful analysis and carefully integrated
planning by these agencies, as well as law
enforcement officials, emergency response phy-
sicians and other first responders, the military,
and others. New partnerships will need to be
forged and old ones strengthened.
Preliminary assessments of our nations
capabilities for responding to possible bioterrorist
attacks have identified many deficiencies. From
the public health perspective, these deficiencies
include inadequate surveillance systems; lack of
rapid diagnostic techniques; insufficient stock-
piles and distribution systems of antimicrobial
agents and vaccines; inefficient communication
systems; and insufficient training of physicians,
epidemiologists, and laboratorians. The deficien-
cies may be more pressing in certain disease
areas than in others. Some diseases that are
considered bioterrorist threats, such as anthrax
and plague, are no longer important public
health problems in most industrialized nations,
so the capabilities and capacities for responding
to outbreaks of these diseases may be at historic
lows. These deficiencies in response capacity can
be traced to the 1960s and 1970s, when
complacency began to erode essential compo-
nents of the public health infrastructure. Since
the early 1970s, at least 25 previously unknown
pathogenic agents and diseases have been
identified, and in recent years mounting
resistance to antimicrobial agents has con-
founded the treatment of many illnesses (3).
A strategic plan for reducing the conse-
quences of new and reemerging infectious
diseases (4) proposes corrective measures for
addressing the infrastructure deficiencies:
instituting better surveillance systems, improv-
ing diagnostic techniques, developing new
vaccines and drugs, and conducting research and
providing training in several areas. The
measures needed to prevent and control
emerging infections are strikingly similar to
those needed to check the threat of bioterrorism.
Improving capabilities and capacities for
responding to one issue will almost certainly
benefit the other. For example, developing rapid
diagnostic techniques that would make it
possible to quickly detect bioterrorist attacks
involving anthrax, plague, or Q fever would have
considerable usefulness in the routine clinical
diagnosis of pneumonia. Distribution systems
set up to deliver antimicrobial agents and
vaccines after bioterrorist attacks would be
indispensable in delivering antiviral compounds
and influenza vaccine during a large pandemic.
Surveillance and communication systems are
fundamental components of an adequate public
health infrastructure, so an electronic, inte-
grated surveillance system based on standard
architecture and vocabulary would serve all
needs.
A value-added approach to infrastructure
development is not a new concept in public
health. In 1951, at the beginning of the cold war,
the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) was
founded at the Center for Disease Control (CDC)
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Mountin, founder of CDC, and was implemented
by Alexander D. Langmuir. Noting the dearth of
trained epidemiologists, Langmuir proposed
training a corps of young physicians that could
investigate outbreaks of disease in strategic
areas. He also noted, A broader but equally
pressing need is to make available competent
epidemiologists to assist in the planning and
organization of the total civil defense program at
all levels. Langmuir also observed that while
this dearth exists even in peacetime, defense
needs exaggerate this deficiency.
In 1951, 22 young physicians and one
sanitary engineer signed on as EIS Officers at
CDC, where they received several weeks of
instruction in epidemiology, biostatistics, and
public health administration and then served for
2 years as field epidemiologists, either at CDC or
in state health departments. EIS has been in
operation since then, and as the purview of CDC
expanded beyond infectious diseases, so have the
size and composition of EIS and the training of
EIS Officers. Surveillance, outbreak investiga-
tions, and research on the epidemiology of new
diseases remain standard activities, however.
EIS has rarely had occasion to investigate
outbreaks caused by the intentional release of
microorganisms (7,8). However, as Langmuir
predicted in 1951, the program has increased
public health preparedness and made important
contributions to the control of communicable
diseases. EIS now has more than 2,000 alumni,
including nearly 200 scientists from abroad.
Many alumni have moved on to distinguished
careers in academia, industry, and clinical
practice, but many others have filled key
positions at federal and state public health
agencies. Trained to consider diseases as
problems of populations, EIS alumni remain a
valuable resource when disease outbreaks occur.
As in 1951, civil defense, and particularly the
use of biological agents against civilian
populations, is of utmost concern. Efforts are
under way to improve the capabilities of the
public health system for detecting and respond-
ing to this threat. Also as in 1951, we have an
opportunity to ensure that improvements made
in response to the threat of bioterrorism have
multiple uses and can be applied to other public
health emergencies. Planning efforts to date
have adopted this viewpoint. Developing a
separate infrastructure for responding to acts of
bioterrorism would be poor use of scarce
resources, particularly if this infrastructure is
never used. Value added should be the
watchwords of the current initiative.
Joseph E. McDade
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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